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LUX FOR LESS: EBAY’S LIABILITY TO LUXURY BRANDS 
FOR THE SALE OF COUNTERFEIT GOODS 
Brandon Peene∗ 
I. INTRODUCTION 
EBay deems itself the world’s largest online marketplace, acting 
as a conduit for registered buyers and sellers around the world to 
come together to buy and sell an endless variety of goods and servic-
es.
1
  The company embraces the fact that it “connects hundreds of 
millions of people around the world every day, empowering them to 
explore new opportunities and innovate together.”
2
  EBay’s market 
value is estimated to be around $30 billion.
3
  The auction house re-
ported 2008 revenues of $8.5 billion,
4
 has approximately 248 million 
registered users across the globe,
5
 and disclosed a total value of 
$59.65 billion in goods and services sold on its site in 2008.
6
 
One of the “new opportunities” created by eBay is that of provid-
ing its users the opportunity to sell counterfeit goods to unsuspecting 
buyers.
7
  EBay’s configuration helps those who traffic in counterfeit 
 
 ∗ J.D., 2010, Seton Hall University School of Law; B.A., Political Science, 2007, 
The College of New Jersey.  I would like to thank Professor Marina Lao for her sup-
port and insight in drafting this Comment. 
 1 See Emily Favre, Comment, Online Auction Houses: How Trademark Owners Protect 
Brand Integrity Against Counterfeiting, 15 J.L. & POL’Y 165, 171 (2007).  
 2 Press Release, eBay Inc., eBay Inc. Applauds Court’s Rejection of Tiffany Coun-
terfeit Claims (July 14, 2008), available at http://investor.ebay.com/ 
releasedetail.cfm?ReleaseID=322126.  
 3 See eBay, Inc.—Stock Quote Analysis at a Glance, FORBES, Nov. 11, 2009, 
http://finapps.forbes.com/finapps/jsp/finance/compinfo/CIAtAGlance.jsp?tkr=EB
AY. 
 4 eBay Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 49 (Feb. 11, 2009), available at 
http://files.shareholder.com/downloads/ebay/749841999x0x281367/1b773a7c-
8c14-45b8-915a-1716ca37dda0/eBay_2008AR.pdf. 
 5 Katie Hafner, Tiffany and eBay in a Fight Over Fakes, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 27, 2007, at 
C9. 
 6 eBay Inc., Annual Report, supra note 4, at 51.  
 7 Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay, Inc., 576 F. Supp. 2d 463, 527 (S.D.N.Y. 2008), aff’d, 
600 F.3d 93 (2d Cir. 2010) (“The rapid development of the Internet and websites like 
eBay have created new ways for sellers and buyers to connect to each other and to 
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goods due to the ability of users to access eBay in relative anonymity, 
the vast amount of items listed at any given time, and the short time 
frame in which auctions can be completed.
8
  Although eBay is not the 
only online auction house where these illicit activities occur, its 
strength, popularity, and profitability make it a significant target for 
trademark owners whose brands are being illegally peddled on eBay 
and who are unable or unwilling to pursue individual counterfeiters.
9
  
These brand owners have alleged that eBay is liable for contributory 
trademark infringement for providing a forum for illegal transactions 
to occur, for failing to take reasonable steps to police its listings, and 
for looking the other way to profit from illegal sales.
10
 
Therefore, some brand owners, particularly those who own what 
are referred to as “luxury brands,” have taken action against eBay for 
providing an arena to facilitate and profit from the sale of counterfeit 
goods.  Nevertheless, countries involved thus far in adjudicating these 
suits are divided in determining eBay’s culpability.  In particular, sev-
eral important cases decided in 2008 produced drastically different 
outcomes, only increasing confusion among those seeking more de-
fined answers as to eBay’s liability to brand owners.
11
  On June 30, 
2008, France’s Commercial Court of Paris ruled that eBay failed to 
adequately police for counterfeit goods in transactions involving 
Louis Vuitton Malleteir (Louis Vuitton) and Christian Dior Couture 
(Christian Dior), two brands owned by the Louis Vuitton Moët Hen-
nessy (LVMH) group.
12
  The court ruled that LVMH was entitled to 
 
expand their businesses beyond geographical limits.  These new markets have also, 
however, given counterfeiters new opportunities to expand their reach.”). 
 8 See Favre, supra note 1, at 168. 
 9 See Mary M. Calkins, Alexei Nikitkov & Vernon Richardson, Mineshafts on Trea-
sure Island: A Relief Map of the eBay Fraud Landscape, 8 U. PITT. J. TECH. L. & POL’Y 1, 
35–36 (2007), http://tlp.law.pitt.edu/wp-content/uploads/2009/10/Calkins.pdf. 
 10 See Dara Chevlin, Student Article, Schemes and Scams: Auction Fraud and the Cul-
pability of Host Auction Web Sites, 18 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 223, 231 (2005); see also Fa-
vre, supra note 1, at 179 (citing the standard for contributory copyright infringe-
ment). 
 11 See Tiffany, 576 F. Supp. 2d at 469; Tribunal de Commerce de Paris [Commer-
cial Court of Paris], June 30, 2008, General Docket no. 2006077799 [hereinafter 
Louis Vuitton Case], available at http://www.sunsteinlaw.com/media/ 
FrenchOpinions.pdf; Tribunal de Commerce de Paris [Commercial Court of Paris], 
June 30, 2008, General Docket no. 2006077807 [hereinafter Christian Dior Case], 
available at http://www.sunsteinlaw.com/media/FrenchOpinions.pdf; see also Brad 
Stone, EBay Cleared in Site’s Sales of Knockoffs, N.Y. TIMES, July 15, 2008, at C1.  
 12 Louis Vuitton Case, supra note 11, at 17; Christian Dior Case, supra note 11, at 17–
18.  
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damages of approximately $63.2 million.
13
  Yet, weeks later, on July 
14, 2008, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New 
York, followed later by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Cir-
cuit, ruled in favor of eBay in a case brought by Tiffany & Co. (Tiffa-
ny), the jewelry manufacturer, holding that eBay took reasonable 
steps to prevent counterfeit sales and acted appropriately when 
alerted of specific counterfeit listings.
14
 
These starkly differing decisions and interpretations of similar 
facts put eBay in a position where its liability appears to depend on 
the plaintiff’s choice of forum.
15
  Such differing judicial interpreta-
tions, or “country splits,”
16
 hold important ramifications for eBay and 
the survival of its business model.  Inconsistencies in rulings can 
prompt a flood of lawsuits,
17
  establish different legal duties eBay owes 
to brand owners depending on the countries involved,
18
 and likely 
create a situation where past, pending, and future litigation will in-
crease costs on both eBay and its users.
19
 
This Comment seeks to examine the consequences of country 
splits in determining eBay’s liability to luxury brands for the sale of 
counterfeit items, as well as the appropriate standard to assess wheth-
 
 13 Christina Passariello & Mylene Mangalindan, EBay Fined Over Selling Counter-
feits—French Court Orders Online Retailer to Pay Louis Vuitton, Other Luxury LVMH Brands 
$63.2 Million, WALL ST. J., July 1, 2008, at B1.  
 14 Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay, Inc., 576 F. Supp. 2d 463, 518 (S.D.N.Y. 2008), aff’d, 
600 F.3d 93 (2d Cir. 2010).  The court also held that “rights holders bear the prin-
cipal responsibility to police their trademarks.”  Id. 
 15 See Roger Parloff, EBay Wins L’Oréal Counterfeiting Case in Belgium, FORTUNE, 
Aug. 12, 2008, http://features.blogs.fortune.cnn.com/2008/08/12/ebay-wins-loreal-
counterfeiting-case-in-belgium/. 
 16 This Comment uses the phrase “country splits” as a shorthand way of describ-
ing the differing interpretations of eBay’s liability by courts and jurisdictions 
throughout the world.  The use of the phrase is similar to that of “circuit splits,” 
which refers to differing judicial interpretations of a similar legal issue between two 
or more U.S. Courts of Appeals.  See, e.g., Concrete Works of Colo., Inc. v. County of 
Denver, 540 U.S. 1027, 560 (2003) (discussing two divergent views among the Courts 
of Appeals as being “worthy of the Court’s review because it presents a clear Circuit 
split”). 
 17 See Suzy Jagger, EBay Braced for Copycat Lawsuits Over Fakes, TIMES (London), July 
2, 2008, at 42.   
 18 See Carol Matlack, LVMH vs. eBay: A Counterfeit Suit, BUS. WK., Sept. 22, 2006, 
http://www.businessweek.com/globalbiz/content/sep2006/gb20060922_888836.ht
m?chan=top+news_top+news+index_global+business.  
 19 See Linda Rosencrance, French Ruling on Counterfeit Goods Could Have Far-
Reaching Effects for eBay, COMPUTERWORLD, July 7, 2008, 
http://www.computerworld.com/s/article/9106618/French_ruling_on_counterfeit_
goods_could_have_far_reaching_effects_for_eBay. 
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er eBay has taken the necessary steps to police its forums for infring-
ing listings.  This Comment contends that eBay’s current initiatives, 
most notably its Verified Rights Owner (VeRO) Program, are suffi-
cient in their reasonableness, efficiency, and effectiveness to shield 
eBay from liability in most situations.
20
  A contrary standard holding 
eBay liable for each infringing listing, regardless of whether it is 
aware of the listing, would be unacceptable, unreasonable, and im-
practicable in an age where individuals are increasingly engaging in 
commerce over the Internet.  Moreover, this Comment asserts that a 
second impetus to litigation is the aspiration of luxury-brand owners 
to prevent their authentic goods from being sold on legitimate sec-
ondary markets at cheaper prices, which thereby diminishes a partic-
ular item’s reputation as a luxury. 
Part II will examine eBay’s business model and its anti-
counterfeiting efforts.  Part III will analyze the divergences amongst 
various nations in determining eBay’s liability.  Part IV will analyze 
the ramifications going forward of these country splits for eBay and 
its users.  In Part V, this Comment argues that eBay satisfies its duty 
with its current and past policing efforts and that brand owners have 
the responsibility to take a primary role in policing for counterfeit 
goods with the expectation that eBay will act when alerted of an in-
fringing listing.  Finally, in Part VI, this Comment seeks to promote a 
worldwide standard for assessing eBay’s liability and uses as a primary 
vehicle the proposed Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA), 
which is presently being negotiated by countries who disagree over 
how to assess eBay’s liability. 
II. EBAY’S BUSINESS MODEL AND POLICING EFFORTS 
A. EBay’s Business Model 
EBay’s success and continuous growth are a testament to its lais-
sez-faire business model, through which it connects people around 
the world by providing a platform for diverse forms of commerce to 
take place under minimal supervision.
21
  This structure has caused 
eBay to grow by leaps and bounds in a relatively short period of time.  
For example, in 1995, the first eBay auction closed on a broken laser 
 
 20 See eBay Inc., Reporting Intellectual Property Infringements (VeRO), 
http://pages.ebay.com/help/tp/vero-rights-owner.html (last visited May 19, 2010) 
(describing VeRO’s mandate and reporting procedure). 
 21 See Press Release, eBay Inc., supra note 2.   
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pointer that was sold for fourteen dollars.
22
  By 2004, eBay had more 
than 1.3 billion listings annually,
23
 and it currently lists more than 140 
million auctions on any given day.
24
  EBay allows buyers and sellers to 
negotiate on the purchase of anything “from jewelry and beauty sup-
plies to cars and antiques.”
25
  Most importantly, eBay requires buyers 
and sellers to carry out the transactions themselves: “[w]hile eBay 
provides the venue for the sale and support for the transaction, it 
does not itself sell the items.”
26
  EBay calls itself a “venue, not an auc-
tioneer,”
27
 supplies a service, not a product, and gives users a forum 
and nothing else.
28
  Thus, the items sold never actually come into 
eBay’s possession, and eBay generally does not know if the buyer ever 
receives the item from the seller.
29
 
Also, eBay does not take responsibility for vetting its millions of 
listings in advance because the cost- and labor-intensive nature of in-
spection would destroy the benefits of its laissez-faire business mod-
 
 22 ADAM COHEN, THE PERFECT STORE: INSIDE EBAY 4–5 (2003).  
 23 Fara S. Sunderji, Note, Protecting Online Auction Sites from the Contributory Trade-
mark Liability Storm: A Legislative Solution to the Tiffany Inc. v. eBay Inc. Problem, 74 
FORDHAM L. REV. 909, 935 (2005) (citing eBay Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 22 
(Dec. 31, 2004), available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1065088/ 
000095013405003827/f0542 6e10vk.htm#010). 
 24 eBay Inc., Annual Report, supra note 4, at 2. 
 25 Sunderji, supra note 23, at 912–13. 
 26 Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay, Inc., 576 F. Supp. 2d 463, 475 (S.D.N.Y. 2008), aff’d, 
600 F.3d 93 (2d Cir. 2010). 
 27 Chevlin, supra note 10, at 233. 
 28 See Sunderji, supra note 23, at 933.  For instance, the eBay User Agreement 
states, 
     You will not hold eBay responsible for other users’ content, actions, 
or inactions, items they list or their destruction of allegedly fake items.  
You acknowledge that we are not a traditional auctioneer. Instead, our 
sites are venues to allow anyone to offer, sell, and buy just about any-
thing, at anytime, from anywhere, in a variety of pricing formats and 
locations, such as Stores, fixed price formats, and auction-style formats. 
We are not involved in the actual transaction between buyers and sel-
lers.  While we may help facilitate the resolution of disputes through 
various programs, we have no control over and do not guarantee the 
quality, safety, or legality of items advertised, the truth or accuracy of 
users’ content or listings, the ability of sellers to sell items, the ability of 
buyers to pay for items, or that a buyer or seller will actually complete a 
transaction or return an item.  
eBay Inc., Your User Agreement (effective Sept. 29, 2009), http://pages.ebay.com/ 
help/policies/user-agreement.html (last visited May 19, 2010).  
 29 Tiffany, 576 F. Supp. 2d at 475. 
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el.
30
  Nevertheless, eBay exercises some control over buyers and sellers 
by requiring them to register with eBay and consent to its User 
Agreement.
31
  To sell on eBay, an individual or entity must register, 
establish a seller ID, and verify that ID, primarily through a credit 
card, debit account, or bank information.
32
  Sellers can then list the 
item in a category of their choosing, either through an auction set to 
end at a specific time or through the “Buy it Now” feature, wherein a 
buyer can purchase the item at a fixed price and instantly end the 
auction.
33
  When a buyer wins an auction, eBay sends an electronic 
notice to the buyer and seller with the expectation that the two users 
will contact each other within three days to discuss payment and 
shipment of the listed item.
34
 
EBay earns a percentage of the value of every sale, including a 
flat fee, and thereby receives revenue from the sale of legitimate and 
counterfeit goods alike.
35
  Sellers must pay eBay an insertion fee to list 
an item, which usually ranges from $0.20 to $4.80, depending on the 
initial listing price.
36
  If the item is sold, sellers pay to eBay a final val-
ue fee, ranging from 5 to 10 percent of the sale price of the auc-
tioned item.
37
  Sellers are also able to pay eBay additional fees to use 
promotional features and selling tools, such as seminars on how to 
 
 30 See Sunderji, supra note 23, at 916. 
 31 EBay’s User Agreement declares, 
     Without limiting other remedies, we may limit, suspend, or termi-
nate our service and user accounts, prohibit access to our sites and 
their content, services, and tools, delay or remove hosted content, and 
take technical and legal steps to keep users off the sites if we think that 
they are creating problems or possible legal liabilities, infringing the 
intellectual property rights of third parties, or acting inconsistently 
with the letter or spirit of our policies.  We also reserve the right to 
cancel unconfirmed accounts or accounts that have been inactive for a 
long time, or to modify or discontinue eBay sites, services, or tools.  
eBay Inc., supra note 28.  EBay also prohibits the sale of certain items, such as fire-
arms, drugs, and alcohol.  Id.; eBay, Inc., Prohibited and Restricted Items—Overview, 
http://pages.ebay.com/help/policies/items-ov.html (last visited May 19, 2010) 
 32 Calkins, Nikitkov & Richardson, supra note 9, at 6. 
 33 Id. at 6–7.  
 34 Id. at 10. 
 35 See id. at 3; see also Handbagged; EBay’s Legal Woes, ECONOMIST, June 21, 2008, at 
76, 76. 
 36 Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay, Inc., 576 F. Supp. 2d 463, 475 (S.D.N.Y. 2008), aff’d, 
600 F.3d 93 (2d Cir. 2010). 
 37 Id. 
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create the perfect listing and marketing calendars to correspond with 
holidays, and to use eBay consultants to help grow their businesses.
38
 
B. EBay’s Policing Efforts 
Since its inception, eBay has taken measures to combat the sale 
of counterfeit goods.  The primary motivation to crack down on 
counterfeit sales within its forums is to establish and maintain the 
goodwill and trust of its users because preventing innocent buyers 
from purchasing falsely labeled goods is critical to both eBay’s bot-
tom line and reputation.
39
  In 1997, eBay established “Legal Buddy,” a 
program in which eBay collaborated with brand owners by manually 
going through and removing specific auctions after being alerted by a 
brand owner that a listed item was counterfeit.
40
  Later, in May 2002, 
eBay began employing its fraud engine, which used complex models 
to search for suspicious activity in its listings.
41
  Prior to the fraud en-
gine, eBay was only able to sift through the listings manually.
42
 
Furthermore, the overarching principle of eBay’s anti-
counterfeiting strategy is to put the onus on brand owners to bear the 
primary responsibility of policing eBay for trademark violations.  The 
primary vehicle used to carry out this policy is eBay’s main anti-
counterfeiting device, the Verified Rights Owner (VeRO) Program.
43
  
Under VeRO, an auction can be closed down based on a brand own-
er’s “good faith belief” that a listed item is fake.
44
  Only VeRO-
registered brand owners can report potentially infringing items 
through the program.
45
  A member brand owner alerts eBay by filing 
a Notice of Claimed Infringement (NOCI).
46
  Upon being alerted, 
eBay can then remove the item.
47
  EBay also works with brand owners 
through VeRO by employing additional mechanisms, such as saving 
searches, providing a program that automatically searches for particu-
lar listings, and cooperating with brand owners seeking personal in-
 
 38 Id.; Calkins, Nikitkov & Richardson, supra note 9, at 7. 
 39 See Sunderji, supra note 23, at 939. 
 40 Id. at 915–16. 
 41 Tiffany, 576 F. Supp. 2d at 477. 
 42 Id.  EBay currently spends $5 million a year on the fraud engine.  Id.   
 43 See Sunderji, supra note 23, at 916; Handbagged; EBay’s Legal Woes, supra note 35, 
at 76; eBay Inc., supra note 20.  
 44 eBay Inc., supra note 20.  
 45 Id. 
 46 Id. 
 47 Id. 
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formation on alleged infringers.
48
  VeRO members are also encour-
aged to create “About Me” pages to provide eBay users with informa-
tion regarding a brand owner’s legal positions and products listed on 
eBay that are likely to be counterfeit.
49
 
Additionally, eBay employs targeted efforts to fight counterfeit-
ing in particularly vulnerable areas, such as in clothing and luxury 
handbags.  EBay’s current initiatives include limiting the number of 
items a seller can list at one time, preventing short auctions for cer-
tain items, and prohibiting sellers in Hong Kong and mainland Chi-
na, where counterfeit trafficking is most pronounced, from listing 
items prone to counterfeiting.
50
 
According to eBay, when a trademark violation occurs, eBay acts 
expeditiously to remove the infringing listing.
51
  EBay removes thou-
sands of auctions per week through VeRO.
52
  Statistics indicate that 
items alerted through VeRO are removed 90 percent of the time 
within twenty-four hours, 70–80 percent of the time within twelve 
hours, and 75 percent of the time within four hours of being 
alerted.
53
  EBay has also put substantial resources into fighting coun-
terfeit-goods trafficking.  The online-auction house spends more than 
$20 million each year to find and remove fake items, employs over 
two thousand individuals to fight counterfeiting, and is currently 
partners with approximately eighteen thousand brand owners 
through VeRO.
54
 
EBay places the onus on brand owners to be the primary investi-
gators of counterfeit items because it asserts that brand owners have 
the expertise and ability to spot counterfeit items more responsibly 
and efficiently.  The auction house contends that “[v]etting each and 
 
 48 Id. 
 49 See eBay Inc., VeRO: Participant About Me Pages, http://pages.ebay.com/ 
help/community/vero-aboutme.html (last visited May 19, 2010).  For instance, both 
Tiffany and Hermès, two companies that have sued eBay over the listing of counter-
feit items, have “About Me” pages and are members of VeRO.  Id. 
 50 Brad Stone, EBay Says Its Crackdown on Fraud Is Showing Results, N.Y. TIMES, June 
14, 2007, at C9. 
 51 Press Release, eBay Inc., eBay Vows to Fight for E-Commerce Following Over-
reach by Luxury Brands Manufacturer (June 30, 2008), available at 
http://investor.ebay.com/releasedetail.cfm?ReleaseID=319007.  
 52 Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay, Inc., 576 F. Supp. 2d 463, 478 (S.D.N.Y. 2008), aff’d, 
600 F.3d 93 (2d Cir. 2010). 
 53 Id. at 478; Roger Parloff, EBay Triumphs in Tiffany Counterfeiting Case, FORTUNE, 
July 14, 2008, http://features.blogs.fortune.cnn.com/2008/07/14/ebay-triumphs-in-
tiffany-counterfeiting-case/.  
 54 Press Release, eBay Inc., supra note 51.  
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every product before it goes up for sale online is not an option” be-
cause of the cost and inefficiency in spotting potential fakes by inex-
perienced investigators.
55
  Moreover, according to an eBay spokes-
man, Hani Durzy, “[W]e don’t have any expertise.  We’re not 
clothing experts.  We’re not car experts, and we’re not jewelry ex-
perts.  We’re experts at building a marketplace and bringing buyers 
and sellers together.”
56
  EBay also contends that brand owners are in a 
better position to determine real and fake products because eBay 
never takes physical possession of the items;
57
 hence, policing is a task 
better suited to those who specialize in manufacturing the goods be-
ing imitated.
58
 
III. COUNTRY SPLITS IN DETERMINING EBAY’S LIABILITY 
Despite eBay’s policing efforts, counterfeiters continue to sell 
counterfeit goods on eBay, prompting brand owners whose trade-
marks are infringed to respond by bringing suit in courts across the 
world.  Recent cases decided in Europe and the United States have 
put eBay in a position in which its liability appears to rest upon where 
a particular lawsuit is filed.  The seminal cases are contradictory 
judgments from France and the United States.  The Commercial 
Court of Paris found in favor of French company LVMH in two sepa-
rate decisions involving its brands Louis Vuitton and Christian Dior.  
In contrast, a U.S. district court decision, later affirmed by the 
Second Circuit, found in favor of eBay in litigation brought by Tiffa-
ny.  These cases, although based on similar facts, come to drastically 
different outcomes, and therefore only increase the confusion over 
how eBay should operate its business. 
 
 55 Vidya Ram, EBay’s Faux Pas, FORBES, June 9, 2008, 
http://www.forbes.com/2008/06/09/ebay-counterfeit-hermes-tech-enter-
cx_vr_0609ebay.html.  
 56 Katie Hafner, Seeing Fakes, Angry Traders Confront EBay, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 29, 
2006, at 1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2006/01/29/technology/ 
29ebay.html. 
 57 For instance, during the Tiffany litigation, eBay’s lawyer stated that “[o]nly Tif-
fany, after all, has the necessary expertise and resources—including tools, trained 
evaluators, access to catalogues, and so on—to distinguish between authentic and 
counterfeit Tiffany products.”  Chad Bray, Tiffany Disputes eBay’s Model, WALL ST. J., 
Mar. 26, 2008, at B5C.  Moreover, eBay alerts trademark owners that “because eBay 
cannot be an expert in your intellectual property rights in over 25,000 categories, 
and cannot verify that sellers have the right to sell the millions of items they post on 
eBay each day,” it must rely on the trademark owners to identify listings that infringe 
on their rights and to bring it to eBay’s attention.  eBay Inc., supra note 20.  
 58 See Sunderji, supra note 23, at 935–36. 
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A. Litigation Between LVMH and eBay 
On June 30, 2008, the Commercial Court of Paris sided with 
LVMH in lawsuits brought against eBay in cases involving two of its 
labels, Louis Vuitton and Christian Dior, holding that eBay did not 
take the steps necessary to prohibit the sale of counterfeit goods on 
its Web sites.
59
  Louis Vuitton “designs, manufactures and markets 
leather goods and luxury ready-to-wear products worldwide under the 
Louis Vuitton trademark” and “enjoys exceptional worldwide renown 
which places it among the world’s most prestigious trademarks.”
60
  
Christian Dior’s reputation makes its products “highly sought after, 
thus giving rise to numerous counterfeit products and various activi-
ties in the nature of commercial parasitism” under the Christian Dior 
label.
61
  Although these brands are known to be counterfeited, Louis 
Vuitton and Christian Dior are not members of VeRO.
62
 
LVMH proclaimed that the vast majority of the hundreds of 
thousands of listings on eBay related to Christian Dior and Louis 
Vuitton are counterfeit.
63
  Based on eBay’s data, there were 149,739 
listings from April 2006 to June 2006 related to Louis Vuitton.
64
  
These listings led to 96,581 actual sales with an average sale price of 
96.50.
65
  Also, 316,904 listings from April 2006 to June 2006 were re-
lated to Christian Dior, and 107,825 sales were completed therefrom 
with an average price, depending on the item, ranging from 15.80 to 
44.60.
66
  LVMH asserted that, of these listings, ninety percent were 
fake.
67
 
Moreover, LVMH alleged that eBay ignored repeated warnings 
since 1999 to take action to prevent the sale of counterfeit LVMH 
products, which LVMH claims caused damage to its brands all over 
the world.
68
  For example, Christian Dior accused eBay of “having 
 
 59 Passariello & Mangalindan, supra note 13. 
 60 Louis Vuitton Case, supra note 11, at 9.  
 61 Christian Dior Case, supra note 11, at 9.  
 62 See Louis Vuitton Case, supra note 11, at 8; see also Christian Dior Case, supra note 
11, at 8.  
 63 Louis Vuitton Case, supra note 11, at 13; Christian Dior Case, supra note 11, at 13. 
 64 Louis Vuitton Case, supra note 11, at 13. 
 65 Id. 
 66 Christian Dior Case, supra note 11, at 13.  
 67 Louis Vuitton Case, supra note 11, at 13; Christian Dior Case, supra note 11, at 13; 
see also Matlack, supra note 18. 
 68 Louis Vuitton Case, supra note 11, at 7 (alleging that eBay failed “to take effec-
tive measures aimed at preventing infringement, such as . . . forcing the sellers to 
PEENE (FINAL) (DO NOT DELETE) 6/21/2010  6:11 PM 
2010] COMMENT 1087 
 
failed to ensure, as it had a duty to do, that its activity did not gener-
ate any unlawful acts” and that “eBay’s willingness to host advertising 
listings that were manifestly unlawful on all its sites . . . encouraged 
the selling of counterfeit items.”
69
  The luxury-brand group also 
charged that eBay committed tortious acts of negligence by failing to 
provide effective means to prevent the sale of counterfeits, which al-
lowed eBay to foster illicit trade for the deliberate purpose of deriv-
ing income from illegal activity.
70
 
LVMH, and later the French court, took the position that eBay is 
not simply a forum for buyers and sellers to interact but is also a bro-
ker participating in the actual transactions.
71
  Thus, LVMH main-
tained that eBay was not entitled to liability protection under French 
or European Community law, which provide limited liability to “hos-
ters” who are merely technical-service providers.
72
  The relevant 
French Law, Article 6-1-2 of the French Law for Confidence in the 
Digital Economy,
73
 is based on Article 14 of the European Community 
Directive on electronic commerce (Article 14),
74
 which set the stan-
 
state that they guarantee the genuineness of the products . . . or . . . terminating the 
account of any seller at the first offense”); Christian Dior Case, supra note 11, at 3 
(claiming that the damages to LVMH also occurred in “Germany, Australia, Austria, 
Belgium, Canada, China, Korea, Spain, the United States, Hong Kong, India, Irel-
and, Italy, Malaysia, New-Zealand, the Netherlands, the Philippines, Poland, the 
United Kingdom, Singapore, Sweden, Switzerland and Taiwan”). 
 69 Christian Dior Case, supra note 11, at 2.  
 70 Louis Vuitton Case, supra note 11, at 10.  
 71 Id. at 7–8. 
 72 Id.  
 73 Article 6-1-2 states that “hosters” are: 
1. Individuals or entities that provide, even gratuitously, for provision 
of public services to the public online communication, the storage of 
signals, writings, images, sounds or messages of any kind provided by 
recipients of these services may not incur liability as a result of activities 
or information stored at the request of a recipient of these services if 
they did not have actual knowledge of their unlawful character or facts 
and circumstances showing that character or if, from the moment they 
had this knowledge, they acted promptly to remove such data or make 
access impossible. 
     The preceding paragraph does not apply when the recipient of ser-
vice is acting under the authority or control of the person referred to 
therein. 
Law No. 2004-575 of June 21, 2004, Journal Officiel de la République Française 
[J.O.] [Official Gazette of France], June 22, 2004, p. 11,168 (translated from 
French).  
 74 Article 14 states that: 
1. Where an information society service is provided that consists of the 
storage of information provided by a recipient of the service, Member 
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dard for a “hoster” to escape liability.  Article 14 states that a hoster is 
granted liability protection if (1) it does not have actual knowledge of 
infringing activity or is not aware of circumstances where illegal activ-
ity could be apparent or (2) if it does have actual knowledge, it acts 
“expeditiously” to remove or prevent access to the illegal activity.
75
 
EBay countered that it is a hoster and therefore entitled to liabil-
ity protection.
76
  The auction house also stated that “it participates ful-
ly in the struggle against infringement by constantly reminding the 
users of its sites of compliance with the laws and regulations” and by 
“setting up [VeRO to help] protect intellectual property.”
77
 
Nevertheless, the Commercial Court of Paris found against eBay 
in both cases.
78
  Most importantly, the court determined that eBay was 
not entitled to protection under Article 6-1-2 or Article 14.  Accord-
ing to the court, because eBay receives a commission based on its ser-
vices, it is not a mere hoster but a broker acting as an intermediary 
between buyers and sellers.
79
  The court looked to several factors in 
reaching this decision. 
First, the court ruled that eBay’s status as a broker signifies both 
knowledge and control over its forums and listings.
80
  Because the 
court found that eBay had actual knowledge of infringing listings, 
represented by eBay’s awareness of general counterfeiting activity, 
eBay should have known of the possibility of counterfeit sales due to 
the prices and volume of LVMH products sold on its sites.
81
  Accor-
 
States shall ensure that the service provider is not liable for the infor-
mation stored at the request of a recipient of the service, on condition 
that: 
     (a)  the provider does not have actual knowledge of illegal activity 
or information and, as regards claims for damages, is not aware of facts 
or circumstances from which the illegal activity or information is ap-
parent; or 
     (b) the provider, upon obtaining such knowledge or awareness, acts 
expeditiously to remove or to disable access to the information. 
2. Paragraph 1 shall not apply when the recipient of the service is act-
ing under the authority or the control of the provider. 
Council Directive 2000/31/EC, art. 14, 2000 O.J. (L 178) 13.  
 75 Id. 
 76 Louis Vuitton Case, supra note 11, at 10.  
 77 Id.  
 78 Id. at 12; Christian Dior Case, supra note 11, at 12. 
 79 See Louis Vuitton Case, supra note 11, at 11.  
 80 See id.; Christian Dior Case, supra note 11, at 11.  
 81 See Louis Vuitton Case, supra note 11, at 12.  For instance, the court noted that 
some auction captions stated that the product was “a fine imitation of a famous Louis 
Vuitton design.”  Id. 
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dingly, it appears that general knowledge of counterfeit activity, with-
out specific knowledge of particular listings, is sufficient to put eBay 
on notice of infringing items in France. 
Second, according to the Commercial Court of Paris, eBay exer-
cised sufficient control over its users to justify denying it liability pro-
tection.  The court found that eBay violated Article 6-1-2, because an 
eBay user “acts under the control or authority of the hosting site” 
since users have to sign up for eBay, and eBay has the power to re-
move both listings and users.
82
  The court also noted that “eBay’s par-
ticipation is essential in the selling of counterfeit products.”
83
  EBay 
establishes programs and relationships with users to ensure the pro-
motion and development of auctions and is a “mandatory player in 
sales taking place . . . [by undertaking] a very active role . . . to in-
crease the number of transactions generating commissions for its 
benefit.”
84
 
The French court also stressed that eBay failed to establish effec-
tive policing measures and profited from its facilitation of unlawful 
illicit goods trading.
85
  The court deemed the establishment of VeRO 
evidence of eBay’s previous negligence, stating that “although meas-
ures have recently been taken by eBay, this only goes to show that it 
has been negligent in the past . . . and . . . therefore it is aware that it 
is wholly and entirely liable.”
86
 
Subsequent to its liability determination, the Commercial Court 
of Paris handed down a significant damages judgment and injunction 
against eBay.  In total, eBay must pay approximately 40 million, or 
about $63 million, to various LVMH brands and is prevented from 
listing certain genuine perfumes made by LVMH pursuant to the in-
junction.
87
  European Union (EU) Member States are permitted to 
enact laws prohibiting the sale of authentic products outside of a se-
 
 82 Christian Dior Case, supra note 11, at 11.  
 83 Id. at 12. 
 84 Louis Vuitton Case, supra note 11, at 11. 
 85 See id. at 10; Christian Dior Case, supra note 11, at 10.  “[S]uch essential partici-
pation by eBay in the marketing of products infringing, in particular, the [LVMH] 
trademarks constitutes tortious activity.”  Louis Vuitton Case, supra note 11, at 12.  
 86 Christian Dior Case, supra note 11, at 12. 
 87 Ladka Bauerova, EBay is Ordered to Pay $63 Million in LVMH Lawsuit, 
BLOOMBERG, June 30, 2008, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid= 
20601085&sid=a3zlHJ0UYAcc.  For instance, 19.28 million is to be paid to Louis 
Vuitton and 16.4 million to Christian Dior fashion.  Id.  The court also allocated 
3.19 million to the makers of Christian Dior, Kenzo, Givenchy, and Guerlain per-
fumes.  Id. 
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lective distribution network.
88
  Consequently, the ruling not only re-
quires eBay to block all sales of counterfeit Louis Vuitton and Chris-
tian Dior products, but also sales of authentic perfumes owned by 
LVMH that are listed by unauthorized distributors.
89
  Thus, the listing 
of both real and fake goods on eBay can subject eBay to potential lia-
bility under French law, severely impacting eBay and its laissez-faire 
business model. 
B. Litigation Between Tiffany and eBay 
On July 14, 2008, in an opinion rendered by Judge Richard J. 
Sullivan of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New 
York, eBay escaped liability in a case brought by Tiffany for the sale of 
counterfeit items.
90
  Tiffany is personified by its trademark blue box, 
and its jewelry symbolizes luxury and wealth.
91
  The jewelry manufac-
turer does not sell its goods through discount stores and closely con-
trols the distribution of its authorized goods.
92
  Tiffany filed suit 
against eBay in 2004 for contributory trademark infringement, claim-
ing that eBay continuously allowed the sale of items falsely bearing 
the Tiffany label when eBay was aware that counterfeit items were 
auctioned on eBay.
93
 
Tiffany argued that the majority of jewelry offered for sale on 
eBay using the “Tiffany” trademark is counterfeit and that eBay prof-
ited from these sales while taking inadequate steps to prevent the 
 
 88 See Consolidated Version of the Treaty Establishing the European Community 
art. 81, Mar. 25, 1957, 2002 O.J. (C 325) 64–65 (describing exceptions allowing 
agreements and business practices by Member States that lead to the “prevention, 
restriction or distortion of competition” in the marketplace).  
 89 The LVMH perfumes are Kenzo, Guerlain, Christian Dior, and Givenchy.  
Press Release, eBay.fr, Suite de la décision de justice rendue la 30 juin dernier [Fol-
lowing the Court Order Issued Last June 30] (July 11, 2008), available at 
http://actualites.ebay.fr/showitem&id=396; see also Ryan Kim, EBay to Appeal Huge 
French Counterfeit Ruling, S.F. GATE, July 1, 2008, available at http://sfgate.com/cgi-
bin/article.cgi?f=c/a/2008/07/01/BUEP11HILD.DTL.   
 90 Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay, Inc., 576 F. Supp. 2d 463, 463 (S.D.N.Y. 2008), aff’d, 
600 F.3d 93 (2d Cir. 2010); see also Stone, supra note 11.  
 91 See Favre, supra note 1, at 165.  “For over 150 years, Tiffany has achieved great 
renown as a purveyor of high quality goods . . . such as jewelry, silver, china, glass-
ware, decorative objects, crystal, and clocks, under the trademark and trade name 
TIFFANY and its variant TIFFANY & CO.”  First Amended Complaint at ¶ 8, Tiffany, 
576 F. Supp. 2d 463 (No. 04 Civ. 4607), 2004 U.S. Dist. Ct. Pleadings LEXIS 9530. 
 92 First Amended Complaint, supra note 91, at ¶¶ 10–11. 
 93 Tiffany, 576 F. Supp. 2d at 469.  
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transactions.
94
  Tiffany claimed eBay had notice that a problem with 
counterfeit Tiffany goods existed but violated its obligation to investi-
gate and prevent the illicit activities by (1) allowing the auctioning off 
of five or more Tiffany items in a single listing and (2) failing to sus-
pend sellers upon learning that the sellers were engaging in infring-
ing activity.
95
 
Tiffany has an “About Me” page stating that most of the “Tiffa-
ny” jewelry sold on eBay is counterfeit
96
 and is one of VeRO’s most 
frequent users.
97
  Through September 2007, Tiffany reported 284,149 
listings through VeRO and was among its top ten reporters.
98
  Moreo-
ver, eBay previously took action when alerted by Tiffany to quickly 
remove listings and suspend sellers.  The jewelry company could only 
point to twenty-three occasions where a seller reported through Ve-
RO resurfaced on eBay under the same registered user name.
99
  Nev-
ertheless, eBay does profit off of the sale of Tiffany items regardless of 
their authenticity.  For example, between April 2000 and June 2004, 
eBay earned approximate revenues of $4.1 million from completed 
auctions with the name “Tiffany” in the listing title.
100
 
In 2004, Tiffany, mindful of its trademark being infringed on 
eBay, implemented a buying program to purchase jewelry items using 
the Tiffany trademark in the auction listing or description.
101
  Of the 
186 pieces of “Tiffany” silver jewelry purchased, seventy-three percent 
were counterfeit, and only five percent of the items bought in the in-
vestigation were as advertised.
102
  Litigation ensued shortly after the 
completion of the buying program.
103
 
Sitting without a jury, the district court held that eBay was not li-
able to Tiffany for contributory trademark infringement.
104
  Contribu-
 
 94 First Amended Complaint, supra note 91, at ¶¶ 22–23.  
 95 Tiffany, 576 F. Supp. 2d at 469.  
 96 Id. at 479. 
 97 For instance, Tiffany reported 20,915 listings in 2003; 45,242 listings in 2004; 
59,012 listings in 2005; 134,779 in 2006; and 24,201 listings through September 30, 
2007.  Id. at 484. 
 98  Id. 
 99  Id. at 489. 
 100 The $4.1 million came from 456,551 sales.  Id. at 481.   
 101 First Amended Complaint, supra note 91, at ¶ 38.  
 102 Tiffany, 576 F. Supp. 2d at 482, 485.  The remaining purchases were “‘imita-
tions’ that might subject the seller to liability, but they were not technically ‘counter-
feit’ because” a Tiffany mark did not appear on them.  Parloff, supra note 53. 
 103 Tiffany, 576 F. Supp. 2d at 482. 
 104 Id. at 470. 
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tory trademark infringement is a doctrine judicially constructed by 
the Supreme Court of the United States in Inwood Laboratories, Inc. v. 
Ives Laboratories, Inc.
105
  In Inwood, the Court stated that “liability for 
trademark infringement can extend beyond those who actually mis-
label goods with the mark of another” and that third parties can be 
held liable for playing a part in the trademark violation.
106
  The Court 
also set forth a test to determine if a party should be held liable for 
contributory trademark infringement.  The Inwood test states, 
[I]f a manufacturer or distributor intentionally induces another 
to infringe a trademark, or if it continues to supply its product to 
one whom it knows or has reason to know is engaging in trade-
mark infringement, the manufacturer or distributor is contribu-
torially  responsible for any harm done as a result of the deceit.
107
 
Subsequent courts have expanded the concept of contributory 
trademark infringement beyond the facts of Inwood.  In Hard Rock 
Café Licensing Corp. v. Concession Services, Inc., the U.S. Court of Ap-
peals for the Seventh Circuit held that a flea market owner could be 
held liable for contributory trademark infringement when flea mar-
ket vendors sell merchandise illegally bearing a brand owner’s 
trademark.
108
  Further, in Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Network Solutions, 
Inc., the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit determined that 
it was irrelevant whether the venue involved was online.
109
  Rather, the 
relevant inquiry for the Inwood test is “the extent of control exercised 
by the defendant over the third party’s means of infringement.”
110
 
Based on these principles, the Tiffany court stated that the In-
wood test can be “read to impose liability for contributory trademark 
infringement beyond” those who manufacture and distribute the 
products.
111
  The court found that eBay exercises sufficient control 
over its Web sites and users to be within the bounds of the Inwood 
framework.
112
  Judge Sullivan considered eBay analogous to the flea 
market in Hard Rock Café because eBay provides the necessary mar-
 
 105 456 U.S. 844 (1982).  
 106 Id. at 853–54.  
 107 Id. at 854.  
 108 955 F.2d 1143, 1148–50 (7th Cir. 1992).  But in that case, the court found that 
there was insufficient evidence to support such a claim.  Id. at 1150. 
 109 194 F.3d 980, 984–85 (9th Cir. 1999). 
 110 Id. at 984. 
 111 Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay, Inc., 576 F. Supp. 2d 463, 505 (S.D.N.Y. 2008), aff’d, 
600 F.3d 93 (2d Cir. 2010). 
 112 See id. at 506. 
PEENE (FINAL) (DO NOT DELETE) 6/21/2010  6:11 PM 
2010] COMMENT 1093 
 
ketplace for the sale of counterfeit goods, takes an active role in faci-
litating transactions between buyers and sellers, maintains significant 
control over listings on its forums, actively promotes the sale of Tiffa-
ny products, and profits from the listing of items and completion of 
sales.
113
 
Under Inwood, Tiffany must prove that eBay continued to supply 
its services to “one whom it knows or has reason to know is engaging 
in trademark infringement.”
114
  Evidence indicated that eBay had ge-
neralized notice that some Tiffany jewelry on its Web site might be 
counterfeit.
115
  Tiffany claimed this generalized knowledge is ade-
quate to incur liability,
116
 but the court disagreed and held that “ge-
neralized knowledge is insufficient to impute knowledge of any and 
all instances of infringing activity to eBay.”
117
  The court found that 
Tiffany’s NOCI reporting through VeRO, its buying programs indi-
cating that counterfeit goods were sold, and its removal requests only 
provide general knowledge to eBay of illegal activity and were thus 
insufficient to establish liability.
118
 
The court was unwilling to hold eBay liable without specific 
knowledge of a particular auction because the amount of illicit list-
ings on eBay is uncertain.
119
  The record revealed that authentic Tif-
fany merchandise was sold on eBay, sometimes in lots of five or more, 
which does not support Tiffany’s argument that jewelry sold in bun-
dles is per se indicative of counterfeiting.
120
  To hold eBay liable based 
on Tiffany’s “five or more” theory would stifle the sale of legitimate 
goods on eBay and increase Tiffany’s rights over the use of its mark to 
the detriment of the consuming public.
121
 
Moreover, the court held that eBay’s policing measures, such as 
VeRO, adequately attack counterfeiting, because when eBay has spe-
cific knowledge of particular infringing listings, it promptly termi-
nates the listings, and when eBay has knowledge of specific counter-
 
 113 Id. at 506–07. 
 114 Id. at 508 (quoting Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 454 U.S. 844, 854 
(1982)).  
 115 Id. at 508. 
 116 Id. at 507. 
 117 Tiffany, 576 F. Supp. 2d at 518.  
 118 Id. 
 119 See id. at 508 (stating that courts have been hesitant to extend liability to de-
fendants where the extent of the infringement is unclear). 
 120 Id. at 509.  
 121 Id. at 510. 
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feit sellers, it promptly suspends them.
122
  Additionally, the court 
stated that even though the burden of policing the trademark rests 
with Tiffany as the brand owner, and not eBay,
123
 eBay’s response 
upon receiving notice of specific infringing items is reasonable and 
appropriate.
124
  Specifically, the court referenced eBay’s investment of 
millions of dollars to fight counterfeiting, its fraud engine, and its 
implementation of VeRO.
125
  Also, contrary to the interpretation of 
the Paris Commercial Court, Judge Sullivan held that eBay’s institu-
tion of new antifraud measures is not a concession of past negli-
gence.
126
  It was simply not technically possible for eBay to have im-
plemented all of its policing measures at an earlier time.
127
 
Furthermore, in contrast to the LVMH decisions, the Tiffany 
court determined that “rights holders bear the principal responsibili-
ty to police their trademarks.”
128
  The court ruled that eBay has no af-
firmative duty to search for infringing items without specific know-
ledge provided to it by the brand owner, such as through NOCI 
reporting.
129
  When eBay did have specific knowledge through VeRO 
of Tiffany’s “good faith belief” that a particular listing was infringing, 
eBay reasonably investigated and promptly removed the auction.
130
  
Tiffany also claimed that eBay allowed repeat offenders to sell coun-
terfeit goods after submitting an NOCI.
131
  Nonetheless, the court 
found that eBay was reasonable in not automatically or permanently 
suspending a seller after receiving an NOCI because an NOCI is not a 
conclusive determination of counterfeiting but only a good faith be-
lief of infringement.
132
 
 
 122 See id. at 515–17. 
 123 Tiffany, 576 F. Supp. 2d at 518. 
 124 Id. at 513.  
 125 Id. at 514. 
 126 Id.  
 127 See id.  These additional policing measures include implementing VeRO, delay-
ing the ability to view listings with certain brand names for review purposes, develop-
ing the capacity to assess the number of items in a given listing, prohibiting one-day 
and three-day auctions of listings with certain brand names, and restricting cross-
border trading.  Id. at 492. 
 128 Id. at 518 (citing MDT Corp. v. N.Y. Stock Exch., 858 F. Supp. 1028, 1034 (C.D. 
Cal. 1994) (“The owner of a trade name must do its own police work.”)).  
 129 Tiffany, 576 F. Supp. 2d at 515.  (“[W]ithout specific knowledge or reason to 
know, eBay is under no affirmative duty to ferret out potential infringement.”). 
 130 Id. 
 131 Id. at 516.  
 132 Id. at 516–17. 
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Additionally, the Tiffany court determined that Tiffany’s desire 
to impute generalized knowledge as sufficient to impose liability 
would damage the legitimate secondary market of authentic goods 
that eBay and other markets provide.
133
  Under U.S. law, secondary 
markets of genuine, brand-name goods are legal.
134
  “As a general 
rule, trademark law does not reach the sale of genuine goods bearing 
a true mark even though the sale is not authorized by the mark own-
er.”
135
  Tiffany requires its jewelry be sold in the United States only 
through Tiffany retail stores, Tiffany catalogs, the Tiffany Web site, 
and Tiffany’s Corporate Sales Department.
136
  Tiffany also has a policy 
of refusing to sell five of the same new items to any one customer 
without the approval of a store manager.
137
  Nevertheless, the South-
ern District of New York, contrary to the findings of the Commercial 
Court of Paris,
138
 found that while brand owners have an incentive to 
curtail the sale of even authentic goods, the law protects legitimate 
secondary markets.
139
 
Ultimately, Tiffany stands for the principle that the brand owner, 
not eBay, has the primary duty to police its forums.  But when a 
brand owner comes across an infringing item and alerts eBay, eBay 
must act swiftly with this knowledge to remove the listing.
140
  Only if 
eBay has specific knowledge can it be held liable for failing to take ac-
tion.  In this case, eBay, through VeRO and its other anti-
counterfeiting initiatives, took reasonable measures to police its Web 
sites for counterfeit goods.
141
  Clearly, the Tiffany decision and the de-
cisions of the Commercial Court of Paris involving LVMH reveal a 
 
 133 See id. at 473. 
 134 Id. (“[T]he law clearly protects such secondary markets in authentic goods.”).  
 135 Polymer Tech. Corp. v. Mimran, 975 F.2d 58, 61–62 (2d Cir. 1992).  
 136 Tiffany, 576 F. Supp. 2d at 472–73. 
 137 Id. at 473. 
 138 See Louis Vuitton Case, supra note 11, at 12.  
 139 See Tiffany, 576 F. Supp. 2d at 473.  The court stated, 
[W]hile rights holders such as Tiffany may have obvious economic in-
centives to curtail the sale of both counterfeit and authentic goods on 
the Internet—after all, every sale of Tiffany jewelry on eBay potentially 
represents a lost sales opportunity via Tiffany’s own authorized distri-
bution channels—the law provides protection only from the former, 
not the latter.  Clearly, eBay and other online market websites may 
properly promote and facilitate the growth of legitimate secondary 
markets in brand-name goods.   
Id. 
 140 See Stone, supra note 11.  
 141 See Tiffany, 576 F. Supp. 2d at 514. 
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split in authority across countries.  For eBay, this country split causes 
problematic future ramifications, including questions regarding the 
stability of its business model and the threat of increased litigation by 
other luxury brands. 
C. Additional European Cases Involving eBay’s Liability for 
Counterfeit Sales 
In addition to the Tiffany and LVMH cases, courts throughout 
Europe have dealt with the question of eBay’s liability for counterfeit 
sales.  Yet, like Tiffany and the LVHM cases, these decisions have not 
cleared up the confusion over how to assess eBay’s liability.  These 
decisions indicate that eBay is more likely to be held liable in Europe; 
however, some European courts have interpreted their laws to protect 
eBay from liability for the way it regulates its Web sites for counterfeit 
goods.
142
 
Courts in France, eBay’s fourth largest market,
143
 appear to be 
more willing than others to hold eBay liable.  Prior to the LVMH de-
cisions, on June 4, 2008, a commercial court sitting in Troyes, France, 
ruled in favor of Hermès International, a French luxury retailer, in a 
lawsuit brought against eBay.
144
  The Hermès suit was rather small in 
scope, involving just two fake Hermès-branded handbags and one 
genuine bag listed on eBay’s French site.
145
  EBay was required to pay 
Hermès 20,000, or approximately $31,000, and to post the ruling on 
its French site for three months.
146
  The French court found that 
“[b]y selling Hermès bags and branded accessories on the eBay.fr site 
and by failing to act within their powers to prevent reprehensible use 
of the site,” both eBay and the seller “committed acts of counterfeit-
ing.”
147
 
 
 142 See Agence France-Presse, EBay Wins Belgian Court Victory Over L’Oréal in Fake 
Case, GOOGLE NEWS, Aug. 12, 2008, http://afp.google.com/article/ 
ALeqM5hPGbbjTZ-A5swZOUOMuaw1kKNRoQ; Jill Insley, L’Oréal Loses British Court 
Battle with eBay, GUARDIAN (London), May 22, 2009, http://www.guardian.co.uk/ 
technology/2009/may/22/ebay-loreal-court-case-counterfeit; Maija Palmer, Ebay 
Wins French L’Oréal Fakes Lawsuit, FIN. TIMES, May 13, 2009, http://blogs.ft.com/ 
techblog/2009/05/ebay-wins-french-loreal-fakes-lawsuit/; Parloff, supra note 15. 
 143 Bauerova, supra note 87.  
 144 See Carol Matlack, Hermès Beats eBay in Counterfeit Case, BUS. WK., June 6, 2008, 
http://www.businessweek.com/globalbiz/content/jun2008/gb2008066_845380.htm
?campaign_id=rss_daily. 
 145 Id. 
 146 Id.; Ram, supra note 55. 
 147 Matlack, supra note 144.  
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Nonetheless, the tide in France may be turning in eBay’s favor.  
On May 13, 2009, a French civil court found for eBay in a lawsuit 
brought by L’Oréal claiming that eBay was profiting from counterfeit 
perfume sales.
148
  Judge Elisabeth Belfort ruled that eBay “fulfilled its 
obligation in good faith” by setting up systems like VeRO to rid the 
site of counterfeit listings and was a mere hoster for the sales, not a 
party to the illegal transactions.
149
  Although the French court found 
in favor of eBay, that decision was in civil court, while the LVMH cas-
es took place in commercial court.
150
  Also, although eBay filed an 
appeal,
151
 the LVMH award has yet to be reversed, suggesting that the 
French courts may still be somewhat adverse to eBay’s business mod-
el.  If courts in France, which are seen as the strictest in Europe in 
terms of fighting counterfeits, are beginning to find for eBay, howev-
er, it suggests that eBay is properly policing its listings for illegal 
goods.
152
 
Like France, Germany has previously refused to grant eBay host 
protection, and one German court has found eBay liable for allow-
ing—and profiting from—the sale of counterfeit goods.
153
  In 2007, 
the German Federal Supreme Court issued a judgment finding eBay 
liable to Montres Rolex SA for listing “counterfeit Rolex watches on 
eBay’s German site.”
154
  The court held that eBay failed to take rea-
sonable steps to prevent the recurrence of counterfeiting once it 
identified clearly infringing items,
155
 which may include items with 
such a low start price that they are likely counterfeit.
156
  The court also 
noted that eBay could be liable in some circumstances “upon [the] 
first notice of infringement.”
157
 
 
 148 Eric Pfanner, French Court Clears eBay in Selling Fake Goods, N.Y. TIMES, May 13, 
2009, at B10, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/14/technology/ 
companies/14loreal.html?_r=1. 
 149 Id.; Palmer, supra note 142.  
 150 Pfanner, supra note 148. 
 151 See id. 
 152 See Palmer, supra note 142. 
 153 See Ram, supra note 55. 
 154 Eric Auchard, EBay Dealt Blow on Fake Rolexes by German Court, REUTERS, July 27, 
2007, http://uk.reuters.com/article/idUKN2736988920070727.  
 155 See id. 
 156 For instance, the court remanded the case to a lower court to determine if the 
low start price of a Rolex watch listing, for example less than 800 euros, was sufficient 
evidence to demonstrate that the listed item was counterfeit.  Id. 
 157 Id. 
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Contrary to the interpretation of German and some French 
courts, other European courts interpret Article 14 in favor of eBay 
and grant it liability protection.  On August 12, 2008, the Belgian 
Tribunal de Commerce cleared eBay of wrongdoing over the sale of 
counterfeit L’Oréal products, primarily Lancôme perfumes, on 
eBay.
158
  The court held that eBay is a passive provider of host services 
under Article 14 and therefore entitled to liability protection.
159
  Simi-
lar to the interpretation of U.S. law in Tiffany,
160
 the court also ruled 
that eBay did not have a “general monitoring obligation” over what 
was listed on its sites.
161
 
Additionally, in a similar case brought by L’Oréal, the United 
Kingdom High Court ruled in May 2009 that eBay “[took] active steps 
to prevent or at least minimise [counterfeit] activities” and is there-
fore shielded from liability to L’Oréal for counterfeit sales.
162
  The UK 
High Court also stated that “[t]he fact that it would be possible for 
eBay Europe to do more does not necessarily mean that it is legally 
obliged to do more, however.”
163
 
L’Oréal has not surrendered in its fight against eBay.  It has also 
filed suit in Germany and Spain over cosmetics sold under such well-
known brands as Lancôme, Ralph Lauren, and Giorgio Armani.
164
  
L’Oréal estimates that 50–60 percent of the fragrances sold on eBay 
bearing its marks are fake.
165
 
As evidenced by the cases above, eBay’s liability is determined by 
the forum country’s laws, and some jurisdictions are more apt to find 
eBay liable than others.  Such discrepancies in the law and how 
eBay’s policing activities are examined will likely lead to confusion, 
high costs, and viability issues for eBay and its users going forward. 
 
 158 Parloff, supra note 15. 
 159 See id. 
 160 See Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay, Inc., 576 F. Supp. 2d 463, 527 (S.D.N.Y. 2008), 
aff’d, 600 F.3d 93 (2d Cir. 2010). 
 161 Agence France-Presse, supra note 142. 
 162 Insley, supra note 142.  
 163 Id. 
 164 Matlack, supra note 144; see also L’Oréal Sues eBay Over Counterfeit Goods, 
REGISTER, Sept. 13, 2007, http://www.theregister.co.uk/2007/09/13/ 
loreal_sues_ebay. 
 165 Alissa Demorest, Faking It, INT’L COSMETIC NEWS, Oct. 1, 2007 (LexisNexis re-
trieved Sept. 1, 2008). 
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IV. RAMIFICATIONS OF THE COUNTRY SPLITS 
The lack of uniformity among nations dealing with similar fact 
patterns in a global economic environment has potentially severe ra-
mifications for eBay.  These include a flood of lawsuits where eBay’s 
liability is dependent on the plaintiff’s choice of forum, higher litiga-
tion costs, the implementation of new anti-counterfeiting measures, a 
possible alteration of its business model, and a disruption of legiti-
mate secondary markets. 
A. Potential Flood of Lawsuits in Forums Unfavorable to eBay 
Brand owners appear unwilling to put in the time or incur the 
cost to pursue individual counterfeiters who peddle illegal goods on 
eBay.
166
  They prefer instead to seek out a prime, exposed, and, most 
importantly, wealthy target to sue, and eBay is an entity that fits that 
mold.
167
  EBay must work efficiently to deter these counterfeiting law-
suits to prevent future litigation by other companies with deep coffers 
who, seeing an opportunity for a large judgment, may be willing to 
take the risk to prevent sales on eBay.
168
  This risk is also justified by 
luxury-brand owners because if they do not take action against eBay, 
the brand owner’s reputation may suffer if its counterfeit merchan-
dise floods the market, which may diminish the brand’s status among 
consumers.
169
 
Some nations appear more willing than others to hold eBay lia-
ble, emboldening luxury brands to file suit in favorable forums.  
Thus, luxury brands whose items are sold across the world or that are 
based in a country where liability is more likely to be found can sue 
eBay in multiple forums at the same time to hedge their bets and im-
 
 166 See Ronald J. Mann, Emerging Frameworks for Policing Internet Intermediaries, J. 
INTERNET L., Dec. 2006, at 3, 8–9.  
 167 See Jess Cartner-Morley, In Search of the Real Deal, GUARDIAN (London), July 2, 
2008, at 15, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/technology/2008/jul/02/ 
ebay.consumeraffairs.  
 168 See Calkins, Nikitkov & Richardson, supra note 9, at 14 (“Because many well-
known companies with deep pockets could file similar complaints, eBay must work to 
resolve this situation in a way that will placate or deter other potential corporate 
plaintiffs.  Otherwise, eBay might be faced with a flood of lawsuits . . . .”); see also De-
morest, supra note 165 (noting that beauty-product companies took a first step by 
prosecuting individual online vendors but that such efforts have been fruitless).  
 169 See Handbagged; EBay’s Legal Woes, supra note 35, at 76.  According to the gener-
al counsel of Gucci Group, “We don’t make any money from sales on eBay, but we 
have to tell people that their bag isn’t real, that we can’t help them get their money 
back, and we become the bad guys.”  Id.   
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prove their chances at victory.  This is the strategy L’Oréal employed 
in choosing to sue eBay in the UK, Germany, Spain, France, and Bel-
gium.
170
 
In addition, luxury brands have the ability to employ a “wait and 
see” approach to litigation.  If a particular forum appears more likely 
to find liability, such as France or Germany, other luxury brands can 
pounce on the judgment, sue in that particular forum, and claim the 
previous cases as precedent.
171
  For instance, if a luxury brand based 
in France, or whose brand is falsely peddled on eBay in France, con-
siders the LVMH award of approximately $63 million and the judg-
ment in favor of Hermès, the brand is more likely to file suit there 
due to France’s interpretation of eBay’s status under French law and 
Article 14.  And when eBay is litigating in countries that have pre-
viously held it liable, eBay has more difficulty arguing that its policing 
efforts are sufficient to prevent liability for the sale of counterfeit 
goods. 
Another dilemma that may prompt a flood of litigation is the po-
tential disparity in how European nations interpret their own laws 
and directives.  German and some French courts are unwilling to give 
eBay “hoster” protection under Article 14, but Belgium and the UK 
ruled that eBay is a passive provider of “host” services and therefore 
entitled to liability protection.
172
  Consequently, even when applying 
the same standard throughout Europe, eBay’s liability may depend 
on circumstances over which it has little control, namely the forum in 
which the luxury brand files suit. 
Moreover, as seen in the LVMH cases and the Tiffany decision, 
courts around the world have vastly different interpretations of 
“knowledge.”  Both European nations that have adopted Article 14 
and the United States use some form of a knowledge test.  While 
France and Germany may interpret actual knowledge to mean a more 
general knowledge of counterfeiting activity, the district court in Tif-
fany found that general knowledge is insufficient to impose liability; 
eBay must have specific knowledge of an infringing listing and fail to 
 
 170 See supra notes 148–49, 158–65 and accompanying text.  
 171 See Rosencrance, supra note 19 (“[L]uxury goods makers are waiting to see the 
outcome of eBay’s appeal to determine whether they will also go after eBay for allow-
ing the sale of counterfeit goods.”); see also Jagger, supra note 17, at 42 (stating that “a 
ruling against eBay . . . would unleash similar lawsuits” and encourage other design-
ers to file suit). 
 172 Parloff, supra note 15 (“In contrast, the German and French courts had found 
that the ‘host’ service exception did not protect eBay because of the active role eBay 
plays in making sales happen and the fact that it takes a commission on every sale.”).  
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adequately act on that knowledge.
173
  Thus, the differing decisions in 
the United States and Europe, as well as a split among Article 14 in-
terpretations, expose eBay to exploratory litigation, brands suing in 
multiple forums to increase their odds and recovery awards, and oth-
er companies waiting in the wings to pounce on precedent. 
B. Adverse Judgments Can Bring Significant Costs to eBay and its 
Business Model 
The disparity in determining eBay’s liability can bring about sig-
nificant costs to eBay, including the costs of litigation, settlements, 
and alterations to its business model.  The biggest costs facing eBay 
are large judgments, such as the $63 million owed to the brands of 
LVMH.
174
  In addition, if eBay is forced to litigate in countries such as 
France and Germany, where it has been held liable in the past, eBay 
may decide to settle with the brand owner, which can also add signifi-
cant costs.
175
  Such settlements can prompt “wait and see” litigation by 
brand owners seeking relief from eBay who may not want to risk liti-
gation in eBay-friendly forums.  Furthermore, if eBay begins to lose 
or settle a higher percentage of its cases, eBay’s argument that it is 
doing enough to police its forums for counterfeit goods will lack cre-
dibility.  Adverse judgments and a higher duty imposed by some Eu-
ropean courts may limit eBay’s ability to maintain its laissez-faire 
business model.  EBay’s business model is premised on providing on-
ly a venue for buyers and sellers to negotiate while refraining from 
taking part in the actual transaction, never taking possession of the 
item or vetting the product, and only removing a listing if prompted 
by a claim of infringement.
176
  EBay’s liability for counterfeit sales 
around the world will surely impose higher duties on it in nations 
where it is found liable for failing to take action and profiting from 
the sales.  Therefore, with unsympathetic courts deeming eBay’s 
business model inadequate, eBay will have to adjust the way it does 
business, creating substantial barriers to commerce. 
 
 173 See Ed Shanahan, Tiffany v. eBay Appeal Grabs Second Circuit Spotlight, AM. LAW 
DAILY, July 16, 2009, http://amlawdaily.typepad.com/amlawdaily/2009/07/tiffany-v-
ebay-appeal-grabs-second-circuit-spotlight.html (last updated July 17, 2009). 
 174 Bauerova, supra note 87.  
 175 See Hafner, supra note 56 (stating that, according to an intellectual property 
attorney, “[t]he cost implied is tremendous” if eBay begins settling cases with brand 
owners).  
 176 See Sunderji, supra note 23, at 913, 915–16. 
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For instance, eBay may have to police its Web site in different 
ways in different countries.  EBay may need to adopt new policing 
and regulatory measures in some nations while maintaining the status 
quo in others.
177
  Millions of dollars will have to be employed to enact 
new takedown measures, policing procedures, and counterfeit-
detection programs to abide by a particular jurisdiction’s interpreta-
tion of the law.
178
  This would be in addition to the $20 million eBay 
spends annually and the more than two thousand individuals eBay 
employs to combat counterfeiting.
179
  EBay will also have to set up cus-
tom policing standards based on a particular country’s laws.  In turn, 
this may diminish consumer choice and reduce the ability of users 
from different parts of the world to do business with one another.
180
 
Increasing eBay’s costs of doing business and detrimentally af-
fecting its business model will not abruptly end all counterfeiting ac-
tivity on eBay.  As long as fraud is inherent in the eBay model, no 
new, stricter, and costlier policing methods will prevent all types of 
counterfeit operations on eBay.
181
  Even so, eBay contends that only a 
small share of the goods sold on eBay are counterfeit;
182
 yet eBay may 
not be able to do much more beyond its current methods.  When 
counterfeit goods are located, the listing is removed, but due to the 
size of eBay and the number of transactions occurring at any given 
time, it may not be possible for eBay to police its sites to the high 
standards desired by some European courts without destroying its 
business model.  It is simply unrealistic to assume that eBay can know 
the exact contents of each and every one of its estimated 2.7 billion 
annual listings or determine the content of a listing without coming 
into possession of the item.
183
  Requiring more might force eBay to 
physically take possession of certain items, like specific luxury items 
 
 177 See Stone, supra note 11. 
 178 See id. (stating that “eBay would be legally required to do more abroad to fight 
counterfeiting than it is required to do at home”).  
 179 Press Release, eBay Inc., supra note 51. 
 180 See Rosencrance, supra note 19.  According to eBay spokeswoman Nichola 
Sharpe, “If we have to change our business in relation to this ruling, it will be a mas-
sive undertaking.”  Id. 
 181 See Stone, supra note 50 (reporting a statement by former eBay CEO Meg 
Whitman that “[f]raud is inherent in marketplaces of our scale”).  
 182 Katie Hafner, supra note 56, at 1. 
 183 Insley, supra note 142. 
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or higher-priced listings,
184
 or to take down particular categories 
where counterfeit trading is most prominent.
185
 
Increased costs in paying out judgments and settlements, as well 
as increased policing expenses, might force eBay to pass the financial 
burden on to its users.
186
  For instance, eBay can impose fee increases 
on sellers for completing transactions or even a fee for simply regis-
tering with eBay.
187
  Also, if the costs became too burdensome, eBay 
might be forced to stop auctioning off certain trademarked goods.
188
  
Moreover, negative media attention discussing eBay as a hotbed for 
counterfeit goods can damage its reputation among current and po-
tential users, thereby adversely affecting the volume of transactions 
and eBay’s business.
189
  If users or potential users become inundated 
with reports of counterfeit-goods trafficking on eBay, they will surely 
be less likely to trade within the forum.  Thus, only high-volume buy-
ers and sellers might want to take advantage of the service eBay pro-
vides, for excessive fees and heightened regulatory standards would 
outweigh the benefits to small-time buyers and sellers.
190
  Finally, 
higher costs may also prevent eBay from investing in newer technolo-
gies to expand and improve eBay’s potential as an arena for global 
commerce for buyers and sellers.
191
  If eBay must expend millions of 
dollars and devote countless resources to attain an unreasonably high 
 
 184 See Bray, supra note 57. 
 185 See Matlack, supra note 18. 
 186 See Ronald J. Mann & Seth R. Belzley, The Promise of Internet Intermediary Liability, 
47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 239, 273 (2005) (“It is well recognized that imposing liability 
on intermediaries will affect the services and prices they present to their custom-
ers.”). 
 187 See Sunderji, supra note 23, at 939. 
 188 See id. 
 189 See Demorest, supra note 165. 
 190 See Mann, supra note 166, at 7 (stating that “especially as the cost of liability to 
the gatekeepers increases significantly, the problem may spiral out of control, such 
that the only remaining customers will be those who use the gatekeeper’s services in 
highly rewarding ways”).  Moreover: 
     Imposing liability on gatekeepers will result in the unraveling of the 
market when the fee hike under gatekeeper liability makes the cost of 
entering the market exceed the value attached to the market by law-
abiding clients.  As law-abiding clients start departing, gatekeepers up-
date their fees to reflect the increase in the proportion of wrongdoers 
in the prospective client pool, which, in turn, further encourages law-
abiding clients to abandon the market.   
Assaf Hamdani, Gatekeeper Liability, 77 S. CAL. L. REV. 53, 74 (2003).  
 191 See Mann & Belzley, supra note 186, at 273–74 (noting that a risk exists that im-
posing burdens on intermediaries will chill the activities of buyers and sellers). 
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policing standard, it is less likely to invest in developing a better mar-
ketplace for its users.  Therefore, adverse judgments and higher stan-
dards for eBay might mean significantly higher costs to the auction 
house. 
C. Disruption of Legitimate Secondary Markets 
Although the prevention of counterfeit sales is the chief concern 
in the litigation involving eBay, a secondary reason that luxury-brand 
owners have sought to take eBay to court is to prevent the distribu-
tion of their trademarked goods in legitimate secondary markets.
192
  
Many luxury-brand owners tightly control distribution networks for 
their products, such as by only using their own shops or a few autho-
rized distributors.
193
  Having their legitimate goods listed on eBay 
prevents these owners from maintaining the desired control over 
their products. 
For instance, in the LVMH cases, the court not only determined 
that eBay was a broker that actively participated in and profited from 
the sale of counterfeit goods, but the court also issued an injunction 
against eBay to stop all sales of legitimate LVMH perfumes manufac-
tured by Guerlain, Givenchy, Christian Dior, and Kenzo.
194
  If such a 
result becomes commonplace, luxury brands will essentially be able 
to control the distribution of their genuine products even after the 
first sale to prevent them from being resold in the future at lower 
prices, preventing those on the lower end of the socioeconomic lad-
der from accessing “luxury” merchandise. 
EBay is keenly aware of such a ramification.  Following the 
LVMH decision, an eBay press release recognized, 
It is clear that eBay has become a focal point for certain brand 
owners’ desire to exact ever greater control over e-commerce. 
 . . . . 
 The ruling . . . seeks to impact the sale of second-hand goods as 
well as new genuine products, effectively reaching into homes and 
rolling back the clock on the Internet and liberty it has 
created. . . .  [C]ounterfeit suits are being used by certain brand 
 
 192 See Roger Parloff, EBay Denied Stay in LVMH Case, FORTUNE, July 11, 2008, 
http://features.blogs.fortune.cnn.com/2008/07/11/ebay-denied-stay-in-lvmh-case/. 
 193 Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay, Inc., 576 F. Supp. 2d 463, 472–73 (S.D.N.Y. 2008), 
aff’d, 600 F.3d 93 (2d Cir. 2010). 
 194 Press Release, eBay.fr, supra note 89. 
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owners as a stalking-horse issue to reinforce their control over the 
market.
195
 
The European Community, through Article 81 of the Treaty Estab-
lishing the European Community (“EC Treaty”), authorizes brand 
owners to use “selective distribution,” which allows manufacturers to 
essentially control how and where their products are sold.
196
  But 
manufacturers must abide by certain requirements.  “Firstly, the na-
ture of the product in question must necessitate a selective distribu-
tion system.  Secondly, resellers must be chosen on the basis of objec-
tive criteria of a qualitative nature.  Thirdly, the criteria laid down 
must not go beyond what is necessary.”
197
  To satisfy Article 81(3) of 
the EC Treaty, the selective distribution must improve production 
and distribution, promote progress, and not have a significantly ad-
verse effect on consumers.
198
 
The French opinion enjoining eBay from allowing its site to be 
used for certain genuine perfumes is inconsistent with U.S. law, 
which allows the sale of authentic products through unauthorized 
channels.
199
  As stated in the Tiffany decision, “[T]he law clearly pro-
tects such secondary markets in authentic goods,”
200
 and “eBay and 
other online market websites may properly promote and facilitate the 
 
 195 Press Release, eBay Inc., supra note 51. 
 196 EUROPEAN COMM’N, GLOSSARY OF TERMS USED IN EU COMPETITION POLICY: 
ANTITRUST AND CONTROL OF CONCENTRATIONS 45 (2002), available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/publications/glossary_en.pdf.  
 197 Id. at 41–42. 
 198 Article 81(3) states, in pertinent part, that selective distribution is permitted in 
the case of the following: 
—  any agreement or category of agreements between undertakings, 
—  any decision or category of decisions by associations of undertak-
ings, 
—  any concerted practice or category of concerted practices,  
which contributes to  improving the production or distribution of 
goods or to promoting technical or economic progress, while allowing 
consumers a fair share of the resulting benefit, and which does not: 
     (a) impose on the undertakings concerned restrictions which are 
not indispensable to the attainment of these objectives; 
     (b) afford such undertakings the possibility of eliminating competi-
tion in respect of a substantial part of the products in question. 
Consolidated Version of the Treaty Establishing the European Community art. 
81(3), Mar. 25, 1957, 2002 O.J. (C 325) 64–65. 
 199 Parloff, supra note 192 (referring to the LVMH injunction as one that “bans so-
called gray-market sales—sales of genuine products through unauthorized chan-
nels—which are not considered illegal in the United States, but are in France”). 
 200 Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay, Inc., 576 F. Supp. 2d 463, 473 (S.D.N.Y. 2008), aff’d, 
600 F.3d 93 (2d Cir. 2010). 
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growth of legitimate secondary markets.”
201
  Although Tiffany and 
other brand owners have an incentive to curtail this activity, which 
may diminish their particular brand’s reputation and prevent them 
from earning a profit from the secondary sales, American law protects 
such markets. 
Even though secondary markets are legal in the United States, 
eBay might still have to remove listings to avoid the possibility that an 
international transaction might involve a buyer or seller in a Euro-
pean nation that does not allow secondary markets.  For example, if a 
U.S. merchant legally posts an authentic bottle of Christian Dior per-
fume on eBay, but a French buyer illegally purchases it, LVMH could 
enforce the French court’s injunction against eBay and subject it to a 
fine of $80,000.
202
  Such an effect chills commerce in secondary mar-
kets, which may be exactly what the luxury-brand owners are seeking 
to accomplish, namely preventing their brand from being listed on 
eBay in any form, whether counterfeit or authentic. 
V. EBAY’S CURRENT POLICING METHODS ADEQUATELY PROTECT THE 
RIGHTS OF BRAND OWNERS AND SHOULD SHIELD  
EBAY FROM LIABILITY 
EBay’s current efforts to prevent and curtail the distribution of 
counterfeit goods are reasonable, efficient, and adequately enforced 
and should therefore shield the auction house from liability.  In addi-
tion, the Tiffany court was correct in its decision that the onus should 
be on brand owners to take the primary role in policing for counter-
feit goods.
203
  This is not to say that eBay has no duty to brand owners; 
eBay must work with brand owners when necessary to remove illegal 
listings.  EBay’s current policy of removing items while engaging with 
brand owners is the most practical and effective remedy available.  Al-
though illegal sales still occur, eBay currently takes an active role in 
removing illicit listings, both on its own and with the help of brand 
owners, and has a track record of serving as an effective source of en-
forcement.
204
 
Nonetheless, several criticisms of eBay’s approach to counterfeit 
goods can be made.  First, critics assert that eBay’s business model ac-
 
 201 Id. 
 202 See Parloff, supra note 192. 
 203 Tiffany, 576 F. Supp. 2d at 518. 
 204 See Mann & Belzley, supra note 186, at 262 (discussing the possibility that in-
termediaries can effectively enforce regulations). 
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tually promotes the sale of counterfeit goods by providing a laissez-
faire marketplace for buyers and sellers to interact.
205
  The auction 
house provides the forum and derives revenue, but does little to mon-
itor the actual listings unless prompted by a brand owner or eBay us-
er.  EBay makes possible the posting of a counterfeit listing by provid-
ing the technology to allow an auction to function, but it only 
engages in transactions by e-mailing the winning bidder auction—
allowing users to act in relative anonymity.
206
  Anonymity allows those 
who peddle in counterfeit goods to do so with greater protection, 
enabling illegal transactions to occur.
207
 
Second, critics argue that eBay is in the best position to search 
for and remove counterfeit listings.  EBay authorizes the listings to be 
posted and therefore should know what it is allowing to be sold in its 
forums.  Because eBay has constructed its marketplace, it is “more 
adept at searching and monitoring its marketplace” than brand own-
ers.
208
  Furthermore, critics contend that eBay has sufficient control 
over the sales by requiring users to sign a User Agreement, removing 
listings, and suspending buyers and sellers.  Also, eBay is aware that 
counterfeit activity is a problem in its marketplace.  Thus, luxury 
brands can fervently assert that eBay is in a better position to protect 
their trademarks by detecting and removing listings of counterfeit 
goods and should thus be held to a higher standard than that im-
posed in Tiffany. 
A third and final criticism is that the volume of sales and ano-
nymity of eBay users put brand owners in a position where eBay ap-
pears to be the only entity from which to seek relief.
209
  Critics con-
tend that, even if eBay is making inroads in deterring illegal sales, 
brand owners should not be forced to bear responsibility for a prob-
lem that is not only eBay’s creation, but from which eBay is earning, 
and will continue to earn, substantial revenues.
210
  Until the sale of 
counterfeit goods hurts eBay financially, such as through high dam-
age awards to luxury brands, eBay might not do what is necessary to 
 
 205 See Sunderji, supra note 23, at 932. 
 206 See id. at 933; see also Calkins, Nikitkov & Richardson, supra note 9, at 10. 
 207 See Mann & Belzley, supra note 186, at 246 (stating “the anonymity that the In-
ternet fosters has made it easier to buy and sell counterfeit goods”). 
 208 Id. at 278.  
 209 See Favre, supra note 1, at 168 (noting that the “anonymity of buyers and sellers, 
the vast quantity of goods passing through the site, and the short timeframe of auc-
tions” impedes the ability to pursue individual counterfeiters). 
 210 See Mann, supra note 166, at 6. 
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prevent illicit trading from continuing.  By holding eBay accountable, 
it will be forced to invest more resources into preventing infringe-
ment.
211
 
Despite these criticisms, eBay’s policing activities are reasonable 
and should shield it from liability.  As a starting point, the brand 
owner, being the expert in its own products, is in the best position to 
determine which products are genuine and which are counterfeit.  
EBay is not as effective in searching for counterfeit products, given 
that it is not an expert in the field, has hundreds of millions of list-
ings at any given time, and never takes possession of the listed item.
212
  
Putting all of the burden on eBay could force eBay to take down legi-
timate goods out of fear that they may be counterfeit.  While this may 
indeed be a motive of luxury-brand owners who seek to further con-
trol the channels of distribution, U.S. law does not prohibit the sale 
of authentic products in the secondary market.
213
  Brand owners are 
in reality more effective in distinguishing between counterfeit and 
genuine products.  These brand owners design, manufacture, and 
distribute these items.  EBay performs none of these tasks.  Hence, 
cooperation between eBay and the brand owner is the most optimal 
way to limit illicit sales. 
In addition, it is clear that eBay promptly removes illicit items 
upon notice from the brand owner.
214
  EBay’s current takedown sys-
tem is the ideal method to police for counterfeit goods as compared 
to a policy that subjects eBay to liability for each illegal sale.  It is im-
possible to comply with a mandate to remove every counterfeit listing, 
but a requirement to remove listings when prompted by the brand 
owner is reasonable, practical, and effective.
215
  In addition, only a 
 
 211 See Sunderji, supra note 23, at 938. 
 212 Mann, supra note 166, at 9.  Also, according to eBay spokesman Hani Durzy,  
As a marketplace, we never take possession of any of the goods sold on 
the site, so it would be impossible for us to solely determine the au-
thenticity of an item . . . .  And we go above and beyond what the law 
requires us to do to keep counterfeits off the site.   
Hafner, supra note 5.  
 213 Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay, Inc., 576 F. Supp. 2d 463, 473 (S.D.N.Y. 2008), aff’d, 
600 F.3d 93 (2d Cir. 2010).  
 214 See id. at 516. 
 215 Statistics indicate that items alerted through eBay are removed 90 percent of 
the time within twenty-four hours, 70–80 percent of the time within twelve hours, 
and 75 percent of the time within four hours.  Id. at 478; Parloff, supra note 53.  
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small share of the millions of listings on eBay at any given time are 
counterfeit.
216
 
While eBay is in a position to prevent and detect, brand owners 
must take a principal role in the process.  Holding eBay liable for 
each counterfeit sale is impracticable and will only push those who 
trade in illicit goods away from eBay and into another forum.  This 
would also leave buyers and sellers of legitimate items, including 
those who make a living from eBay, with limited options in seeking to 
acquire and sell unique items at a lower transaction cost.
217
  Thus, the 
risk of imposing a heightened duty on eBay, beyond what it already 
does to police, will likely chill the sale of legitimate goods and servic-
es.
218
 
Moreover, simply because eBay is an easy target does not mean 
that imposing liability is justified.  EBay’s investment is already vast, 
and some type of fraud will always occur on eBay regardless of the ef-
fectiveness of an anti-counterfeiting program.  EBay already spends 
$20 million a year, employs thousands, and has its own brand and 
reputation at stake to motivate it to combat counterfeiting effectively. 
Developing a reputation for combating fraudulent activity in its 
marketplace helps eBay establish a heightened trust with users, po-
tential users, those willing to do business with eBay, and regulators 
who might otherwise decide to look at eBay with a closer eye.
219
  A 
reputation that it does little to stop counterfeiting would taint eBay’s 
goodwill, erode user trust, and as a result, impair eBay’s business.
220
  
Consequently, eBay and brand owners share a mutual interest in li-
miting the expansion of counterfeit-goods trafficking.  Simply creat-
ing unreasonable expectations would not make eBay any more effec-
tive or diligent in searching for and removing counterfeit goods. 
Under the standard applied in Tiffany, eBay will still be held lia-
ble if it does not take effective action and fails to remove items that it 
 
 216 See Hafner, supra note 175.  EBay estimates the amount to be about six thou-
sand.  Id. 
 217 See Hamdani, supra note 190, at 74. 
 218 See Mann & Belzley, supra note 186, at 274.  
 219 See Calkins, Nikitkov & Richardson, supra note 9, at 23 (“[E]Bay has likely be-
come . . . involved in fraud protection . . . to encourage transactions and build the 
trust of its users, to respond to strong outside pressure . . . and avoid the specter of 
outside regulation, and to reduce the possibility that its users might . . . resort to self-
help tactics harmful to eBay’s business.”). 
 220 See id. at 32 (stating that eBay has a strong motivation to combat fraud “be-
cause it harms eBay’s business by tarnishing its goodwill and eroding user trust”).  
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knows or should know are counterfeit.
221
  For instance, if eBay has 
specific knowledge from its own research or from a VeRO member 
that an item is counterfeit and fails to act, it will be liable to the brand 
owner for allowing the sale to occur.  Allowing eBay to remain on the 
offensive, but without the fear of judgments in the tens of millions of 
dollars, enables eBay to expand its research and development into 
better technology to provide both consumer and brand protection.  
It is good business for eBay to prevent counterfeit sales in its forums 
and even more beneficial to its reputation to be able to say that its ac-
tions work. 
Additionally, VeRO is an effective answer to counterfeit sales, 
both in theory and in practice.  It is an existing infrastructure that re-
cognizes the problem and works together with the brand owner to 
find the solution.  Through VeRO, eBay acknowledges that both sides 
can work together to effectively police trademark infringement and 
that while eBay may have some control over its forums, brand owners 
are better able to distinguish between genuine and counterfeit 
items.
222
 
Putting the heavier burden on eBay, without the assistance from 
brand owners, will put unreasonable pressure on eBay’s business 
model and harm both eBay and its millions of users.  Fee increases, 
subscription costs, and heavy investments into policing procedures 
are no guarantee that counterfeit sales will cease.  Imposing such 
immense pressure and unreasonable standards on eBay or other on-
line auction houses to rid their forums of counterfeit goods may 
prove eBay’s current business model unworkable. 
Furthermore, while heightened standards may satisfy the goal of 
luxury brand owners of seeking to prevent eBay from operating in its 
current form, eBay’s business practices satisfy both the Inwood test 
and Article 14.  The Inwood test and Article 14 both give eBay the lia-
bility protection it needs when actual knowledge of infringing activity 
is absent.  Inwood holds a defendant liable for contributory trademark 
infringement if it intentionally induces a third party to engage in 
trademark infringement and knows or has reason to know such activi-
ty is ongoing.
223
  Article 14 holds an intermediary, such as eBay, liable 
if the intermediary has actual knowledge or awareness and fails to 
 
 221 See Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay, Inc., 576 F. Supp. 2d 463, 507 (S.D.N.Y. 2008), 
aff’d, 600 F.3d 93 (2d Cir. 2010). 
 222 See Favre, supra note 1, at 172, 175. 
 223 Id. at 180 (citing Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 454 U.S. 844, 854 
(1982)).  
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remove or disable access to illegal information, and Article 14 also 
denies liability protection when the eBay user is acting under the in-
ducement, authority, or control of the provider.
224
  Like the Inwood 
test, Article 14 does not hold an intermediary liable when the inter-
mediary does not have actual knowledge of the illegal activity and 
does not control the user.
225
 
Actual knowledge should be interpreted under the “specific 
knowledge” interpretation applied in Tiffany.
226
  A “specific know-
ledge” test is the most practical and reasonable standard to place on 
eBay, but it can also efficiently and effectively serve the ultimate pur-
pose of ridding eBay of counterfeit goods.  When eBay has specific 
knowledge, it acts expeditiously to remove listings that are likely to be 
counterfeit.
227
  The French LVMH court, however, appeared to in-
terpret actual knowledge differently—as eBay’s general knowledge of 
counterfeit activity occurring on its forums.
228
  Moreover, the Paris 
Commercial Court stated that eBay’s addition of new procedures to 
police counterfeit activity was an admission that it had been negligent 
in removing counterfeit listings.
229
  This is inconsistent with the Tiffa-
ny court’s finding that as eBay developed new technology to combat 
the problem, it implemented these measures to better police its Web 
sites and not to simply correct past mistakes.
230
  New eBay programs, 
such as VeRO, are instituted as technology progresses to better ad-
dress the counterfeiting issue, which eBay has taken seriously since its 
inception.
231
 
In addition, while eBay has some control over users, it operates 
under a laissez-faire business model that does not entail direct in-
volvement in the actual transaction.  EBay, although retroactively 
present in the form of taking action after the user has already acted, 
does little to prevent the user of its service from placing a counterfeit 
good up for auction.  Therefore, eBay’s business model satisfies the 
 
 224 Council Directive 2000/31/EC, art. 14, 2000 O.J. (L 178) 13.  
 225 See id. 
 226 Tiffany, 576 F. Supp. 2d at 511. 
 227 Id. at 515 (“[T]he record reveals that when eBay became aware, through its 
VeRO Program, of Tiffany’s good-faith belief that a listing was infringing, it investi-
gated and removed that listing from its website.”). 
 228 See Louis Vuitton Case, supra note 11, at 11. 
 229 Christian Dior Case, supra note 11, at 12; see also Louis Vuitton Case, supra note 11, 
at 12. 
 230 See Tiffany, 576 F. Supp. 2d at 514. 
 231 See id. at 492. 
PEENE (FINAL) (DO NOT DELETE) 6/21/2010  6:11 PM 
1112 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 40:1077 
 
“control” requirement under Article 14(2) to be entitled to liability 
protection.
232
  Users control their own accounts, decide whether to list 
or buy items, control the length of the auction, and work together 
with buyers to decide on payment and shipping methods.
233
  EBay can 
shut down listings or suspend users but only upon the request of buy-
ers or brand owners who believe an item is counterfeit.  This process 
should satisfy both the Tiffany ruling’s actual/specific knowledge test 
and Article 14’s requirement of acting quickly to remove infringing 
material.  Thus, coupled with eBay’s reasonable, efficient, and effec-
tive response to brand owners who can bring attention to counterfeit 
listings, eBay should escape liability under both Inwood and Article 14. 
Brand owners are better off partnering with eBay to fight coun-
terfeiting than remaining on the outside and seeking to bring litiga-
tion.  Companies whose brands are counterfeited can alert eBay and 
force it to take down illicit listings, and if eBay does not take such an 
action upon specific knowledge, brand owners should have legal re-
course against the auction house. 
VI. THE ANTI-COUNTERFEITING TRADE AGREEMENT  
AS A POSSIBLE SOLUTION 
Because different countries have interpreted eBay’s liability in 
vastly contrasting ways, one possible solution is to provide a frame-
work for courts around the world to analyze cases involving the sale 
of counterfeit goods on eBay in a consistent, uniform manner.  A po-
tential answer is the proposed Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 
(ACTA) that is currently in the early stages of development.
234
  Partic-
ipants engaged in ACTA negotiations include the United States, the 
members of the European Union, Australia, Canada, Japan, Korea, 
Mexico, Morocco, New Zealand, Singapore, and Switzerland.
235
 
The ACTA attempts to fight counterfeiting in three ways: (1) by 
building international cooperation and harmonizing communication 
 
 232 See Council Directive 2000/31/EC, art. 14(2), 2000 O.J. (L 178) 13. 
 233 Favre, supra note 1, at 193. 
 234 See Press Release, Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, Ambassador Schwab 
Announces U.S. Will Seek New Trade Agreement to Fight Fakes (Oct. 23, 2007), 
available at http://www.ustr.gov/ambassador-schwab-announces-us-will-seek-new-
trade-agreement-fight-fakes.  
 235 Press Release, European Comm’n, Anti-Counterfeiting: EU, U.S. and Others 
Meet in Washington to Advance ACTA (July 31, 2008), available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/trade/issues/sectoral/intell_property/pr310708_en. 
htm; Press Release, Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, supra note 234. 
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and standards between nations, (2) establishing common enforce-
ment practices to protect brand owners, and (3) creating a common 
and modern legal framework to deal with counterfeiting issues in the 
global economy.
236
  The negotiations behind the ACTA have been 
kept relatively secret thus far, so the official positions taken by the 
parties involved regarding auction-house liability for counterfeit sales 
are unclear at this point.
237
  Nonetheless, the negotiations provide an 
opportunity to seek uniformity and cooperation in attacking the issue 
of counterfeit goods in online auctions. 
Additionally, the ACTA provides the opportunity for nations 
with differing standards for assessing auction-house liability to come 
together to craft a uniform standard to help not only eBay, but brand 
owners as well, in attempting to prevent counterfeit sales.
238
  In creat-
ing a common legal framework to enforce anti-counterfeiting policy, 
it is possible for the countries to provide safeguards for auction hous-
es like eBay by allowing them to operate their business while at the 
same time requiring cooperation with brand owners in seeking to 
eliminate counterfeit goods from the online marketplace.  This 
framework can require the specific knowledge test of Tiffany to be the 
standard: if eBay has specific knowledge of infringing material, it 
must take quick action to remove such material or face liability.
239
 
An ACTA provision involving auction-house liability can give 
eBay predictability in deciding how to run its business without having 
to worry about litigating in forums that are known to be unfavorable 
to its business model.  Realistically, however, it will be difficult to ex-
tend to eBay internationally the protection that it appears to have 
under U.S. law, especially with the EU, which has a strong stance 
against eBay and secondary markets, as a participant.  Yet, uniformity 
is needed, and the ACTA is currently an option toward harmonizing 
 
 236 OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, 
FACT SHEET: ANTI-COUNTERFEITING TRADE AGREEMENT 1–2 (2007), available at 
http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/asset_upload_file122_13414.pdf; Press Re-
lease, European Comm’n, supra note 235.  
 237 See Press Release, Found. for Free Info. Infrastructure, EU Council Refuses to 
Release Secret ACTA Documents (Nov. 10, 2008), http://press.ffii.org/ 
Press_releases/EU_Council_refuses_to_release_secret_ACTA_documents.  
 238 One of the expressed areas of interest to create uniform measures of enforce-
ment is in “Internet distribution and internet technology.”  OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE 
REPRESENTATIVE, supra note 236, at 2.  
 239 See Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay, Inc., 576 F. Supp. 2d 463, 527 (S.D.N.Y. 2008), 
aff’d, 600 F.3d 93 (2d Cir. 2010).  
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the standard that eBay has to satisfy to escape liability.  Uniformity 
will avoid problems associated with having a legal transaction take 
place in the U.S. that is illegal under French law and with eBay’s re-
medial actions (in taking down infringing listings) being considered 
sufficient in the United States or Belgium but not in France or Ger-
many.  The ACTA can also prevent the confusion over how EU Mem-
ber States interpret Article 14.  Presently, some nations, like France 
and Germany, interpret the provision to deny eBay protection, but 
Belgium holds to the contrary.  Therefore, the ACTA is an option 
that can be pursued to promote uniformity in assessing eBay’s liability 
to brand owners. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
In light of the recent Tiffany and LVMH decisions, eBay’s liabili-
ty to brand owners for the sale of counterfeit items remains unre-
solved on a world-wide basis.  The two cases, although containing sim-
ilar facts, reached drastically different conclusions, leaving eBay to 
face potential situations where its liability remains unknown. 
EBay’s predicament is largely dependent on the plaintiff’s 
choice of forum.  The Tiffany decision, based on U.S. law, indicates 
that eBay will not be held liable if it fails to take action when it has 
merely generalized knowledge of counterfeit sales but may be liable if 
it fails to act upon specific knowledge, either through its own investi-
gation or through VeRO.  A French or German court, on the other 
hand, will likely not give eBay liability protection in a similar context.  
EBay will thus be held liable for facilitating and profiting from the 
sale of counterfeit goods in these forums when it has general know-
ledge of counterfeiting.  Yet, as a Belgian court ruling has shown, Ar-
ticle 14 can be interpreted differently among European nations and 
in favor of eBay.  These country splits can lead to drastic ramifications 
for eBay, such as a flood of litigation by luxury brands against eBay in 
favorable forums, increased costs that may be passed on to eBay users, 
threats to eBay’s business model, and the removal of genuine luxury 
goods from secondary markets. 
Nevertheless, eBay’s current policing measures, most notably 
VeRO, are sufficient, reasonable, and effective in combating counter-
feit sales.  Working with brand owners is the key to stopping this 
fraud.  It is unrealistic to compel eBay to prevent every illegal sale; 
therefore, eBay needs to rely on the expertise of brand owners, and 
brand owners need to rely on the ability of eBay to take action when 
appropriate.  EBay has shown a willingness to act when it needs to do 
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so.  Brand owners need to take some responsibility for protecting 
their trademarks, and holding eBay to the higher standard of some 
European courts would threaten eBay’s business model and the legi-
timate service it provides to willing customers all over the world. 
The ACTA is a possible answer to the issue of addressing eBay’s 
liability.  Although it is a formidable task to get countries with differ-
ing opinions to come together on a uniform standard, it is the best 
solution to the current uncertainty. The ACTA should place a duty 
on eBay to remove a listing when eBay has specific knowledge of an 
alleged counterfeit listing, such as when it knows or should know that 
the auction is illegitimate through its own investigation or upon in-
formation that the brand owner supplies.  Such a uniform standard 
would prevent the confusion, irregularity, and unfairness in judg-
ments where liability has and will continue to appear to be based on 
the forum in which the lawsuit against eBay is filed. 
 
